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THE EFFECT OF TAXES ON ADOPTION OF STOCK OPTION PLANS
ABSTRACT
In the early 1970s many firms replaced their qualified stock option
plans with non- qualified plans. Although tax and incentive reasons
for the switch may interact, previous evidence has indicated that
tax reasons for the change dominated incentive reasons . This paper
suggests that previous work may have been biased in favor of the
tax hypothesis and develops a stronger test of the tax motivations
for the change. The timing and tax status of firms that switched
suggest that taxes were not the dominant factor behind the
switches. Evidence presented in this paper indicates that switches
following the Tax Reform Act of 1969 were strongly associated with
size of the firm.

THE EFFECT OF TAXES ON ADOPTION OF STOCK OPTION PLANS
1. INTfiDDUCTION
Two lines of literature have evolved to explain the observed
forms of management compensation contracts adopted by U.S. firms.
One line predicts selection of management compensation plans that
minimize the combined tax liability of the corporation and the
corporate manager [Hite and Long, 1982; Miller and Scholes, 1982].
A second line, based on agency theory, predicts selection of
compensation plans that encourage management behavior that is
consistent with maximization of firm value and minimization of costs
associated with divergent actions [Ross, 1973; Jensen and Meckling,
1976; Watts, 1977; Watts and Zimmerman 1978; Smith and Watts, 1982;
Lewellen, loderer, and Martin, 1987].
Smith and Watts [1982] argue that the two explanations are not
mutually exclusive. They claim that some variation in the cross-
sectional use of compensation plans cannot be explained by taxes and
can be explained by incentive effects. As Scholes and Wolfson
[1984] note, "[t]axes represent only one among many factors of
production. It is important to avoid being seduced into the naive
pursuit of tax minimization if achievement of this objective
requires sacrificing more important goals." In order to conclude
that either hypothesis dominates the decision to choose a particular
plan, a research design that considers the possible effect of both
hypotheses on the decision is desirable.
The purpose of this study is to provide a test of the tax
hypothesis in a setting in which a change in the tax rules should
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have induced a change in stock option plans. Hite and Long [1982]
found that the Tax Reform Act of 1969 induced a change in management
compensation from the qualified stock option plan predominant in the
early 1960s to a variety of non-qualified plans. However, their
research design may have been biased in favor of the "tax
hypothesis" because of the firms that were included in the study
(the top 100 of the "Fortune 500") . These firms are likely to be
high tax firms, making it impossible to control for the effect of
differential tax rates. This study provides a stronger test of the
tax hypothesis in the same setting by including firms with
differential tax rates and by controlling for a number of other
factors that may help explain adoption of stock option plans.
For example, Ciscel and Carroll [1980] discuss a rather long-
standing debate in the economics literature over whether the level
of executive compensation is better explained by firm size (scale of
operation) or by profitability. The profitability argument appears
to be more consistent with the agency literature, while the size
argument may be consistent with the tax hypothesis. Smith and Watts
[1982] observe that stock options are more commonly used in larger
companies, and they attribute this difference to the fact that
executives in larger firms are subject to higher tax rates relative
to their employers than are executives in smaller firms.
Industry affiliation also may play a role in selection of
compensation plans. Smith and Watts note that stock option plans
have been more popular in unregulated than in regulated industries.
They argue [p. 155] that since options can serve to offset managers'
tendencies to select risk-reducing investment, one should expect to
see options used more often in unregulated than in regulated
industries. However, they also note that there is considerable
variation in the use of stock option plans among unregulated
industries.
Finally, the tax motivation to use options may be mitigated in
situations in which a company enjoys a substantial tax shield in the
form of interest deductions or depreciation expense. Therefore,
debt/equity and capital intensity ratios were included in this study
as control variables.
2. EXPECTED EFFECT OF TAXES ON THE USE OF STOCK OPTIONS
Prior to passage of the 1969 Act, qualified stock options were
far more commonly used than non-qualified stock options, even though
both were permitted. An individual who exercised a qualified stock
option and held the stock for at least three years was taxed only
once—at the time the stock was sold. At that time, the difference
between the selling price and the exercise price was treated as a
tax-favored capital gain. The corporation was never allowed a
deduction for compensation expense.
In contrast, a non-qualified stock option resulted in wage
income to the recipient equal to the excess of market price over
exercise price at the time the option was exercised. Later, when
the stock was sold, the option recipient recognized capital gain
income equal to the difference between exercise price and selling
price. Thus, a portion of the income was taxed earlier and at a
higher rate than would have been the case had the option been
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qualified. However, the corporate employer was allowed a deduction
for compensation expense at the same time the option recipient was
required to recognize wage income. 1
Following the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, the top
rate on earned income dropped from 70 percent to 60 percent in 1971
and to 50 percent in 1972. At the same time, a new system of tax
preferences was created. Among these preferences, which could incur
a ten percent minimum tax and reduce income eligible for the lower
rates on earned income, were the capital gains deduction and the
difference between purchase price and market value of exercised
qualified stock options. Corporate statutory rates remained
unchanged at 48 percent.
Hite and long demonstrate analytically that as a result of the
1969 changes in the law, non-qualified plans would dominate
qualified plans if
where tg = the effective marginal tax rate on capital gains,
tg = the marginal tax rate on earned income,
tp = the marginal tax rate on tax preference income, and
t^, = the marginal tax rate on corporate income.
The left-hand side shows the tax liability to the executive per
dollar of income from a qualified plan and the right-hand side the
joint liability of the executive and corporation per dollar of non-
qualified option income if the corporation switches from a qualified
to a non-qualified plan and passes along to the employee the tax
saving from conversion as additional options. A switch to a non-
qualified plan should occur if the tax savings to the corporation
exceed the additional tax imposed on the option recipients.
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Assuming a corporate marginal rate of 48 percent and an
individual marginal rate of 50 percent on earned income (the highest
statutory rates in 1972) , an effective tax rate on option income
(t^ + tp) of only four percent would have provided an incentive to
switch from a qualified to a non-qualified plan. However, an
effective tax rate of 50 percent on option income would be required
under the same conditions if the corporation's marginal tax rate
were zero. 2
Of the firms in Hite and Long's sample (the top 100 firms in
the "Fortune 500") , 86 percent employed qualified stock option plans
in 1968. By the end of 1975, 94 percent of these firms had switched
to non-qualified stock option plans. Hite and Long conclude [p.
13] that the observed pattern of switching activity supports the
hypothesis "that tax considerations have a strong impact on the form
of compensation contracts." We would expect to observe the same
behavior in our high tax group. Ln our low tax group, however,
little or no tax saving was available to the firms. Therefore, the
tax hypothesis would not predict switches from qualified to non-
qualified plans for this group since the extra tax imposed on the
option recipient would produce little or no tax benefit to the
employer.
3. SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA COLLECTION
A sample of 157 firms was selected from the Compustat data
tapes (Annual Industrial) . This sample includes all firms that we
define as "low tax firms." For purposes of this study, a low tax
firm is defined as one that had an average federal income tax
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liability for the current year (item 63 on the Compustat tapes)
equal to or less than zero for the years 1966 through 1975. This
requirement ensures that the low tax firms selected had a relatively
long history of low taxes before the 1969 Tax Reform Act as well as
some expectation that the condition would continue. Thirty-two
firms met this definition of a low tax firm for the years 1966
through 1975.
High tax firms were defined as those that had positive current
tax liabilities and no loss carryforwards over the same period.
Two-hundred fifty firms met this condition. We selected 125 (every
other firm from the list) . Table 1 provides a summary of the firms
included in the sample by two-digit SIC code and indicates the
number in each category that adopted a non-qualified stock option
plan (NQSOP) during the period 1969-75.
Insert Table 1
Using data from annual reports, 10-Ks, and prospectuses for
stock option plans, we determined what kind of stock option plan (if
any) each firm had in 1969 and what changes to these plans occurred
over the years 1969-75. Additionally, using data from Compustat,
the following variables were collected for each firm:
SIZE = Net Sales
DE = Debt/Equity Ratio, defined as Long Term Debt/
Long Term Debt + Equity
CAP = Capital Intensity, defined as Net Plant Assets/
Total Assets
PR = Profitability, defined as Net Income/Total Assets
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4. KESUIIES
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Tables 2 and 3 present descriptive statistics for the variables
of interest for the total sample, firms that adopted NQSOPs, and
firms that did not using 1969 and average 1969-75 values. The
number of adoptions was 53 for high tax firms and 16 for low tax
firms.
Insert Tables 2 and 3
Tables 4 and 5 present means tests and median tests for
adopters versus nonadopters using 1969 and average 1969-75 values.
These results indicate that firms that adopted NQSOPs were
significantly larger than non-adopters regardless of whether 1969 or
average 1969-75 data were used. However, the sample of adopters and
non-adopters do not appear to be different when compared on the
dimensions of debt/equity, capital intensity, or profitability.
Insert Tables 4 and 5
The tax hypothesis suggests that timing of adoptions may be
important. As tax rates for executives dropped from 1969 to 1972,
we might expect that high tax firms would benefit from a switch to
non-qualified plans much earlier than would low tax firms. However,
the results presented in Table 6 show that 56 percent of low tax
adopters switched to non-qualified plans before 1973 while only 43
percent of high tax adopters switched during the same period. This
pattern suggests that tax rate differentials were not a dominant
factor in the decision to switch.
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Insert Table 6
Two other results are worth noting. Of the 157 firms included
in the sample, 69 (44 percent) adopted NQSOPs. This is a much lower
percentage than that reported by Hite and Long. Further, a higher
percentage of low tax firms (50 percent) adopted NQSOPs than did
high tax firms (42 percent)—the opposite of the tax hypothesis
prediction.
4.2 Multivariate Analysis
A logistic model was employed to test the association between
the variables discussed above and the likelihood that firms adopted
a non-qualified stock option plan during the period 1969-75.
One problem with estimating the model is the expected
correlations between the variables selected. However, collinearity
diagnostics indicate that any multicollinearity that exists in very
unlikely to be harmful to the analysis. 3
The model was estimated using 1969 values for sales,
debt/equity, capital intensity, and profitability under the
assumption that the decision to adopt non-qualified stock option
plans occurred in the year the Tax Reform Act was passed. Thus,
values of the variables for 1969 should have some predictive power
for adoptions over the next seven years.
Only the coefficient for size is significant at p < .05.
Capital intensity is significant at the .18 level, suggesting little
cross-sectional variation in capital intensity between adopters and
non-adopters. Note that tax status appears to have no effect on
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adoption. The prediction table at the bottom of Table 7 indicates
that the model correctly identifies 84 percent of non-adopting firms
and 36 percent of adopting firms for an overall prediction rate of
63 percent. While the prediction rate is not high, the model is
able to distinguish between adopters and non-adopters better than a
naive model based on frequency of firms in the sample.
Insert Table 7
A second model, presented in Table 8, was estimated including
only the 125 high tax firms and using a continuous variable (taxes
paid/book income) for tax status. As in the first model, the
independent variables all were based on 1969 values. In this model
the coefficients for size, capital intensity, and the tax rate were
significant at p < .05. Among high tax firms, those that adopted
NQSOPs were larger, less capital intensive, and experienced lower
effective tax rates. The model correctly identified 85 percent of
non-adopting firms and 47 percent of adopting firms for an overall
prediction rate of 69 percent. 4
Insert Table 8
Finally, to control for industry effect, dummy variables to
represent seven of the eight one-digit SIC codes were inserted in
the model. None of the coefficients was significant. However,
inspection of Table 1 reveals that firms in some industries are more
likely to adopt NQSOPs. Specifically, a greater percentage of firms
in the oil and gas extraction, chemicals, electronics, and
industrial machinery industries adopted NQSOPs. This suggests that
an industry effect may exist, but it is not statistically
significant in our sample.
4.3 Further Analysis of Low Tax Firms
Disclosures in the annual reports and/or lOKs of some of the
low tax firms reveal a possible explanation for the unexpectedly
large number of NQSOP adoptions by these firms. A number of these
companies had options that were allowed to lapse because the option
price was greater than the market price of the stock. Obviously,
such options have little incentive value to the holders. The 1974
annual report of North American Phillips states, "The market price
of NAPC's common stock is substantially below the option price of
the majority of the outstanding stock options and, in management's
view, the situation impairs the incentive nature of the outstanding
options."
Firms with this concern have several choices. One is to
exchange new options at lower prices for outstanding but still
unexpired QSOPs (three firms did this) . Another is to adopt a NQSOP
which, as noted in footnote 1, can be outstanding for as long as ten
years, thereby increasing the probability that management's efforts
will be reflected in higher stock prices before the options lapse.
It was not always possible to determine whether or not firms in
our sample were in the position of having outstanding options that
did not represent potential bargain purchases to the holders.
However, some of the firms reported the aggregate option price and
the aggregate market value of outstanding options.
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Of the 16 low tax firms that adopted NQSOPs, aggregate option
price and aggregate market value of outstanding options was
available for some years for 15 of the firms. Of these 15 firms,
only two reported aggregate market price greater than aggregate
option price for at least half of the years for which data were
available. Of the 16 low tax non-adopters, this information was
reported for nine of the firms. Three of the nine exchanged new
QSOPs at lower prices for unexpired QSOPs and four reported
aggregate market price in excess of aggregate option price for at
least half the years for which data were available. These results,
although based on incomplete data, suggest that incentive
motivations rather than tax motivations prompted the adoption of
NQSOPs among the low tax firms in our sample.
5. DISCUSSION
The results presented here do not provide direct support for
the tax hypothesis although some indirect support is provided. The
fact that firms with low capital intensity ratios were more likely
to adopt NQSOPs is consistent with the notion that these firms have
a lower tax shield from depreciation and therefore may be more
sensitive to tax motivations. On balance, however, the results are
inconsistent with the tax hypothesis. Firms most likely to adopt
NQSOPs after the Tax Reform Act of 1969 were the largest firms. Tax
status did not distinguish adopters from non-adopters.
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FOOTNOTES
^In addition to these differences in tax treatment, there are some
other potentially important differences between qualified and non-
qualified stock options. Qualified stock options can be outstanding
for no more than five years, and the option price cannot be less
than fair market value at the time of issue. On the other hand,
non-qualified options can be outstanding for up to ten years, and
the option price can be less than fair market value at the time of
issue.
2For effective marginal corporate rates of ten and 20 percent, the
effective tax rate on option income would have to be 45 and 41
percent, respectively, to induce a switch from a qualified to a non-
qualified plan. At this time, the statutory rate on capital gain
income was 25 percent for capital gains of $50,000 or less. For
larger amounts, the rate could go as high as 35 percent.
Additionally, as a "preference item," capital gain income reduced
the amount of income eligible for the maximum rate of 50 percent on
earned income and subjected that income to the individual's highest
marginal rate on unearned income (maximum rate 70 percent) . Thus,
it would be possible for a capital gain to cause income that would
otherwise have been taxed at the 50 percent rate to be taxed instead
at the 70 percent rate. Therefore, an individual in the highest tax
bracket for earned income and unearned income could pay an effective
tax rate of 45 percent on option income.
3The model was estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) with
diagnostics for multicollinearity. Although the results of any
significance tests cannot be relied upon, the collinearity
diagnostics should not be affected by using a dichotomous dependent
variable in an OLS regression. Using Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch's
[1980, p. 112] criteria for deternuriing harmful collinearity, the
diagnostics do not suggest a problem.
4Three additional models were run. The first used average measures
for the independent variables for the period 1969-75. In this
model, the coefficients for size and capital intensity were
significant at p < .05, the Chi-Square value was 16.7618 with 5
D.F., and the overall prediction rate was 65 percent. The second
model used a stricter definition of low tax firms (five low tax
firms were dropped) . Only the coefficient for size was significant
at p < .05, the Chi-Square value was 16.66 with 5 D.F., and the
overall prediction rate was 65 percent. The third model used
changes in the independent variables from 1969-75. Again, only the
coefficient for size was significant at p < .05, the Chi-Square
value was 17.1167 with 5 D.F., and the overall prediction rate was
67 percent.
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TABLE 1
INDUSTRY DISTRIBUTION
BY TWO-DIGIT SIC (N=157)
TWO
DIGIT
SIC
NUMBER
OF
FIRMS
NUMBER OF
FIRMS
ADOPTING
10 Metal Mining
13 Oil and Gas Extraction
14 NonMetallic Minerals
15 General Building Contractors
17 Special Trade Contractors
20 Food and Kindred Products
21 Tobacco Products
22 Textile Mill Products
23 Apparel and Other Textile
24 Lumber and Wood Products
25 Furniture and Fixtures
26 Paper and Allied Products
27 Printing and Publishing
28 Chemical and Allied Products
29 Petroleum and Coal Products
30 Rubber & Misc Plastics
31 Leather and Leather Products
32 Stone, Clay, and Glass
33 Primary Metal Industries
34 Fabricated Metal Products
35 Industrial Machinery & Equip
36 Electronics
37 Transportation Equipment
38 Instruments and Related Prod
39 Misc Manufacturing
40 Railroad Transportation
42 Trucking and Warehousing
44 Water Transportation
48 Communications
49 Electric, Gas, and Sanitary
50 Wholesale Trade-Durable Goods
51 Wholesale Trade-NonDurable
52 Building Materials and Garden
53 General Merchandise Stores
54 Food Stores
55 Automotive Dealers
56 Apparel and Accessory Stores
57 Furniture and Home Furnishing
58 Eating and Drinking Places
59 Miscellaneous Retail
65 Real Estate
70 Hotels and Other Lodging
73 Business Services
75 Auto Repair, and Services
79 Amusement and Recreation
80 Health Services
89 Services NEC
1
6 5
1
1 1
1
9 3
1 1
1 1
2 1
2 1
1
5 2
5 2
16 11
9 5
6
1 1
4 3
5 1
8 3
9 8
11 4
2 1
3 1
3
2
3 1
1
1 1
1
2 1
2 1
2
5 1
4 1
1
1
1 1
1
1
1 1
1
4 2
1 1
2
3 1
2 1
TOTAL 157 69
TABLE 2
SUMMARY STATISTICS
TOTAL SAMPLE
Year=1969 N=157
VARIABLE MEAN
STANDARD
DEVIATION MEDIAN
MINIMUM
VALUE
MAXIMUM
VALUE
Year=1969 N=157
SIZE 461.7005 913.0709 145.2340 5.6910 8448.0000
DE 0.1755 0.1105 0.1672 0.0000 0.4954
CAP 0.3903 0.1888 0.3638 0.0305 0.8980
PR 0.1477 0.0900 0.1275 0.0005 0.5316
Average Values 1969-75 N=157
SIZE 670.5323 1231.9322 221.8317 8.3887 10746.7200
DE 0.1838 0.1031 0.1924 0.0000 0.4548
CAP 0.3869 0.1828 0.3625 0.0473 0.8479
PR 0.1362 0.0709 0.1218 0.0204 0.4033
Legend
SIZE = Net Sales
DE = Debt Equity
CAP = Capital Intensity
PR = Profit rate
TABLE 3
SUMMARY STATISTICS
1969 values
STANDARD MINIMUM MAXIMUM
VARIABLE MEAN DEVIATION VALUE VALUE
NGN-ADOPTERS (N=88)
SIZE 292.8212 514.8168 5.6910 2747.1990
DE 0.1750 0.1139 0.0000 0.4954
CAP 0.4018 0.1977 0.1720 0.8980
PR 0.1558 0.0967 0.0091 0.5316
ADOPTERS (N=69)
SIZE 683.9088 1219.2289 6.1000 8448.0000
DE 0.1761 0.1068 0.0000 0.4713
CAP 0.3761 0.1778 0.0305 0.8303
PR 0.1372 0.0800 0.0005 0.3112
Average Values 1969-75
STANDARD MINIMUM MAXIMUM
VARIABLE MEAN DEVIATION VALUE VALUE
NON-ADOPTERS (N=88)
SIZE 420.8177 719.9813 8.3887 4273.6380
DE 0.1777 0.1059 0.0000 0.4154
CAP 0.3631 0.1694 0.0473 0.8479
PR 0.1420 0.0749 0.0277 0.4033
ADOPTERS (N=69)
SIZE 989.0089 1623.2235 13.4900 10746.,7200
DE 0.1915 0.0997 0.0110 0..4548
CAP 0.4063 0.1919 0.1125 0..8354
PR 0.1288 0.0651 0.0204 0..3395
Legend
SIZE = 1969 (Average) Net Sales.
DE = 1969 (Average) Debt Eguity.
CAP = 1969 (Average) Capital Intensity.
PR = 1969 (Average) Profit Rate.
TABLE 4
MEANS TESTS
Adapters (N=69) versus Non-Adapters (*£=88)
MEANS
VARIABLE ADOPT NON-ADOPT Z-value p-value
1969 Values
SIZE 683.908 292.820 2.47 .0136
DE 0.175 0.176 NA NS
CAP 0.376 0.402 NA NS
PR 0.156 0.137 1.31 .1906
Average Values 1969-1975
SIZE
DE
CAP
PR
989.008 420.817
0.192 0.177
0.363 0.406
0.156 0.137
2.69
NS
1.21
1.18
.007
NS
.226
.238
Legend
SIZE
DE
CAP
PR
= 1969
= 1969
= 1969
= 1969
(Average) Net Sales.
(Average) Debt Equity.
(Average) Capital Intensity.
(Average) Profit Rate.
TABIE 5
MEDIAN TESTS
Adopters (N=69) versus Non-adopters (N=88)
NUMBER OF FIRMS WITH
OBSERVATIONS GREATER
VARIABIE THAN MEDIAN VAIDE CHI-SQUARE P-value
1969 values
SIZE Adopters 41 3.456 .0633
Non-adopters 38
DE Adopters 35 NA NS
Non-adopters 44
CAP Adopters 33 NA NS
Non-adopters 46
PR Adopters 30 1.478 .2241
Non-adopters 48
Average Values for 1969-1975
SIZE Adopters 41 3.455 .0631
Non-adopters 38
DE Adopters 38 NA NS
Non-adopters 41
CAP Adopters 30 1.47 .2253
Non-adopters 48
PR Adopters 32 NA NS
Non-adopters 46
legend
SIZE = 1969 (Average) Net Sales.
DE = 1969 (Average) Debt Equity.
CAP = 1969 (Average) Capital Intensity.
PR = 1969 (Average) Profit Rate
TABLE 6
ADOPTIONS BY YEAR
HIOI TAX VERSUS LOW TAX ADOPTERS
1969-75
Year High Tax Low Tax
1969 3 6
1970 4 2
1971 9 1
1972 7
1973 10 6
1974 11 1
1975
_9
53
_0
16
TABLE 7
LOGTT ESTIMATION
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 1 IF NQSOP
ADOPTED BETWEEN 1969 AND 1975
1969 VALUES FOR INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR T-RATIO
SIZE 0.0008 0.0003 2.7116
DE -1.7117 1.9788 -0.8650
CAP -0.9000 0.6060 -1.4851
PR -3.0200 2.6204 -1.1525
TAX 0.4195 0.4484 0.9355
CONSTANT 0.6446 0.8282 0.7784
T.TKFT.THnon FUNCTION= -100.,93
CHI-SOUARE= 13.49 5 D.F. P=.0192
CRAGG-UHLER R-SQUARE . 1102
Legend
SIZE = Net Sales 1969.
DE = Debt Equity 1969.
CAP = Capital Intensity 1969.
PR = Profit Rate 1969.
TAX = High Tax or Low Tax over period 1969-1975.
PREDICTION SUCCESS TABLE
FOR LOGIT ESTIMATION
ACTUAL
1
PREDICTED
74.
14.
44.
25.
ADOPTERS=l NONADOPTERS=0
NUMBER OF RIGHT PREDICTIONS = 99.0
PERCENTAGE OF RIGHT PREDICTIONS = 0.63057
TABLE 8
LOGTT ESTIMATION
High Tax Firms with Estimated Tax Rates
1969 Values (n=125)
VARIABLE
NAME
ESTIMATED
OOEFFICTENT
STANDARD
ERROR
T-RATIO
SIZE 0.0009 0.0003 2.6496
DE -1.3364 2.3984 -0.5571
CAP -2 . 2677 0.8706 -2.6047
PR -0.17806 3.0230 -0.0589
TRATE -5.7063 2.3063 -2.4742
CONSTANT 3 . 1841 1.4290 2.2282
LOG-T.TKFTIHOOn FUNCTION = -74.626
CHI-SQUARE = 21.1364 5 D .F. P = 0. 0008
CRAGG-UHLER R-SQUARE .20906
Legend
SIZE = Net Sales 1969.
DE = Debt Equity 1969.
CAP = Capital Intensity 1969.
PR = Profit rate 1969.
TRATE = Estimated Tax Rate 1969,
PREDICTION SUCCESS TABLE
PREDICTED
ACTUAL
61.
11.
1
28.
25.
ADOPTERS=l NONADOPTERS=0
NUMBER OF RIGHT PREDICTIONS = 86.0
PERCENTAGE OF RIGHT PREDICTIONS = 0.68800
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